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China’s Official Financing to the Pacific
Bob Jurriaan Van Grieken and Jaroslaw Kantorowicz
Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University Turfmarkt, The Hague, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
With China rapidly expanding its aid programme in the Pacific
Islands region, there is a growing concern among established
powers about China’s sway over the aid-dependent Pacific Island
states. Systematic studies of China’s development finance to the
small island countries are, however, rare and generally limited to
mapping Chinese finance flows in the Pacific. This study seeks to
contribute to the literature on China’s development efforts in the
Pacific Islands region. Drawing on project-level data from AidData
for the period 2000–2014, this paper disaggregates China’s official
financing into its constituent parts and systematically explores the
determinants of China’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)
and its commercially-oriented finance flows to the Pacific. The
panel data analysis finds that, contrary to popular belief, China
does not reward voting compliance in the United Nations nor is its
allocation of financing to the Pacific influenced by the countries’
level of indebtedness.
Introduction
China’s growing role in the development landscape is a topic of increasing
interest among academics, journalists, and policy-makers alike. The literature
on China’s development role in Africa, in particular, has proliferated rapidly
in the last two decades (see, among others, Bräutigam 2009, 2011; Dreher
et al. 2018).1 This is perhaps unsurprising given that the majority of China’s
aid targets African states (Zhang and Smith 2017, 2333). Among the top ten
recipients of Chinese Official Development Assistance (ODA), seven are
located on the African continent (Dreher et al. 2017, 9).
Yet since 2006, Beijing has significantly expanded its development foot-
print in the Pacific Islands region, which contains several of the most aid-
dependent countries in the world. On a per capita basis, ODA in the Pacific
is higher than in any other region. Seven of the world’s 15 most aid-
dependent states (based on ODA as a proportion of Gross National
Income (GNI) between 2012–2014) are situated in the Pacific Islands region
CONTACT Jaroslaw Kantorowicz j.j.kantorowicz@fgga.leidenuniv.nl Institute of Security and Global Affairs,
Leiden University, Turfmarkt 99, The Hague 2511DP, Netherlands
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website
GEOPOLITICS
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1654459
© 2019 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
(Dornan and Pryke 2017). Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact scope
of China’s development finance activities in the Pacific region, as Beijing
does not disclose the details of its financing flows to recipient countries,
recent estimates suggest that China is bound to overtake Australia as the
largest donor to the Pacific. This may be attributed in part to the US$4 billion
in development finance which China pledged to the region last year (Lowy
Institute 2018; Lyons 2018).
In parallel, China’s foreign aid policy – with ‘no strings attached’ – is
a ‘lightning rod of criticism’ (Dreher et al. 2018, 182). The debate on China’s
engagement in the Pacific centres around (1) the wastefulness of Chinese aid
projects (Graue and Dziedzic 2018);2 (2) the increasing indebtedness of the Pacific
Island Countries (PICs) to Beijing as a result of Chinese concessional loans, which,
in effect, leaves open the possibility of Chinese political economic leverage over
recipient PICs (Brant 2015);3 (3) the destabilising effect of Chinese financial
assistance, supposedly exploiting and encouraging corruption and instability in
the region and impeding the PICs’ economic and political development
(Henderson and Reilly 2003); and (4) the geopolitical competition in the Pacific,
a region that has traditionally been regarded as within Australia’s and the United
States’ ‘sphere of influence’ (Brant 2015; Wallis 2017; Wesley-Smith 2013).4
The latter point is especially important given that, although China is finan-
cing a wide array of development projects across Africa, the Caribbean, Latin
America, Eastern Europe, and South Asia, the Pacific in particular is consid-
ered a geopolitical bellwether. As China continues to increase its official
financing to the PICs, there is a growing concern that Beijing – as it has
done previously in the South China Sea – may attempt to secure access to
infrastructure of the Pacific Island states which could be used to militarise the
strategic waterway.5 China’s potential sway over the indebted PICs, as well as
the seemingly waning influence of the established powers in the Pacific, has
purportedly prompted Australia, New Zealand and the United States to not
only expand their military prowess, but also to coordinate and enlarge their aid
budget to the Pacific Islands region. This shift in policy, exemplified by a swell
of new investments in 2018, follows years of successive foreign aid budget
retrenchments by these countries (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
2018; McCulloch 2018; U.S. Department of State 2017). As Beijing and the
established powers contend for influence over the PICs, the Pacific Islands
region is believed to increasingly take the shape of ‘the stage for a new cold war
of strategic competition’ (Cave 2018).
Despite the heated rhetoric, relatively little systematic academic work
exists investigating Beijing’s development efforts in the Pacific. Notable
exceptions are Brant (2015) and the Lowy Institute (2018) which revolve
around mapping Chinese ‘aid’ flows to the PICs. In contrast to these studies
which fixate on where Chinese development finance is given, this paper
focuses specifically on why Beijing allocates development finance to the
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PICs. Whilst China’s motivations behind its provision of financial assistance
to the PICs have been analysed within a growing literature, there is consider-
able disagreement among scholars whether China’s official financing is
driven by Beijing’s foreign policy goals, Chinese economic interests, or the
institutional quality of recipient countries. Even though there exists
a plethora of qualitative research on this issue, the topic has received less
attention in quantitative studies.
The main question this paper addresses reads as follows: What are the
determinants of China’s official financing to the Pacific Island Countries?
In answering this research question, this study builds on a recent influ-
ential paper by Dreher et al. (2018). In their paper, Dreher et al. (2018)
explore the determinants of Chinese state financing to African countries,
differentiating between ODA and commercial-oriented flows – i.e. Other
Official Flows (OOF). As a further step into the analysis of China’s
development efforts in the Pacific Islands region, it is crucial to disag-
gregate and separately analyse the constituent parts of China’s official
financing to the PICs. This is particularly important as the practice of
lumping together China’s different financing flows under the label ‘aid’
has both reinforced misperceptions of China’s economic engagement with
developing countries and fostered skewed discussions about China’s
development intentions. That being said, it should be noted that the
PICs are more subject to ODA than OOF. This is not only due to the
PICs’ aid dependency, but also, and perhaps by extension, because there
are fewer commercial opportunities in the Pacific than, for instance, in
Africa. This is further reiterated by the two China-Pacific Island Countries
Economic Development and Cooperation Forums at which China pledged
concessional loans and other forms of development financing to the
Pacific region (see Section 3.1 for a more detailed description of both
forums).
Therefore, as a logical extension of the recent surveys of Brant (2015)
and the Lowy Institute (2018), this paper applies Dreher et al.’s (2018)
differentiation of different flow types to the Pacific Islands region for the
time period 2000–2014 to assess whether each flow type is driven by
Beijing’s foreign policy interests, their economic interests, or the institu-
tional quality of potential recipient PICs. The plan of this paper is as
follows: the next section presents a review of the existing literature and
outlines the theoretical underpinnings for how the different flow types
correspond to different interests. The paper then introduces the data and
empirical strategy used to test the hypotheses, thereby describing and
justifying the case selection, data collection, and method of analysis.
Following a description of the results, the final section discusses the
wider implications of the findings.
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Existing Literature and Theoretical Underpinnings
In spite of an emerging consensus that the allocation of development finance
is not driven by humanitarian needs per se, but instead for both strategic and
political purposes (see, for instance, Alesina and Dollar 2000; Keohane 1967;
Maizels and Nissanke 1984), China’s allocation of official financing remains
surrounded by ‘myths’ and ‘misconceptions’ (Bräutigam 2009). Scholars,
policy-makers, and journalists have claimed that Beijing’s provision of grants
and loans is directed towards securing access to natural resources, creating
exclusive economic opportunities for Chinese firms, and gaining diplomatic
recognition from its recipients at the expense of Taiwan. Additionally, China
is believed to focus its development efforts on undemocratic countries.
Taken together, it follows that Beijing has earned the dubious reputation
of a ‘rogue donor’ as its financial assistance is seemingly guided by self-
interest instead of recipient need (Naím 2007; see also Bräutigam 2009).
However, much of the controversy surrounding Beijing’s development activ-
ities stems from a recurring issue in the literature on China’s development
finance, which is the tendency to lump the different types of state financing
together under the label ‘aid’ (Brant 2013; Dreher et al. 2018). In other words,
following the work of Dreher et al. (2018), it is expected that the different
drivers – i.e. Beijing’s foreign policy, their economic interests, and the
institutional quality of potential recipients – have distinctive effects on the
allocation of the two separate flow types to the Pacific, namely ODA and
OOF, that are analysed in this paper.
Foreign Policy Interests
There exists an extensive literature in the field of political economy empha-
sising that development assistance is frequently provided for political reasons
(Alesina and Dollar 2000; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Vreeland and Dreher
2014). According to this view, foreign aid is used to maintain or gain
alliances, punish political defiance, and influence foreign public opinion
about the donor. Although most of the literature in this field revolves around
the United States and other major European donors, one can expect that
China, like its Western counterparts, uses development finance to advance its
foreign policy interests. This claim has been supported by both anecdotal and
statistical evidence. With regard to the former, it has been indicated that
China uses foreign aid packages to gain the backing of African recipients in
different multilateral settings with the aim of building ‘coalitions to shield
Beijing from Western criticism’ (Tull 2006, 460–461). Similarly, China’s
ambassador to Vanuatu, Liu Quan, recently declared that Beijing required
support at the United Nations in return for Chinese provided development
assistance, stating ‘there is no free lunch’ (Klan 2018).
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Furthermore, in line with a large body of systematic research connecting
vote outcomes in both the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to aid allocation decisions of
Western donor countries (Alesina and Weder 2002; Dreher, Sturm, and
Vreeland 2009a, 2009b), recent studies on China’s foreign aid policy show
that Beijing likewise uses development assistance to influence voting beha-
viour in the United Nations. Both Dreher and Fuchs (2015) and Dreher et al.
(2018) indicate that recipient states which vote with Beijing in the UNGA are
rewarded with greater levels of Chinese financing. The magnitude of this
effect is substantial, to the extent that an increase in voting coincidence by
10 percentage points increases grant funding by 51 per cent (Dreher et al.
2018, 188–189). In contrast, Dreher et al. (2018) do not find that recipients’
increased levels of voting similarity with Beijing is rewarded with increased
commercial flows, i.e. OOF.
Whilst China rewards its allies with increased ODA, it also punishes its
adversaries in terms of the likelihood of and extent to which development
finance is provided. More explicitly, Beijing punishes those that recognise
Taiwan as an independent state, as its allocation of official financing is tied to
the recipient country’s stance on the ‘One-China policy’ (Bräutigam 2009;
Zhang and Smith 2017).6 This has also been established in recent quantitative
research that shows that countries which recognise Taiwan receive less ODA
from China (Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Dreher et al. 2018).
The dominant view in the political economy literature is that development
finance helps advance the donor state’s political interests. Given that ODA
flows are more concessional in nature than OOF, it is expected that China
uses such financing to buy policy concessions from recipient states in the
UNGA (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008, 144). Or, put differently,
‘for any given financial commitment, the larger the grant element, the more
the recipient government will value the transfer and thus the larger the
“[favour]” a donor can expect in return’ (Dreher et al. 2018, 184). As such,
donor countries are likely to resort to ODA packages as a means to achieve
foreign policy goals.
This is reiterated by the domestic context in which China’s foreign aid
policy is shaped. Due to the lack of an independent foreign aid agency, line
ministries, such as the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA), are the primary government actors that determine
the allocation of ODA flows (Dornan and Brant 2014; Varrall 2016; Zhang
and Smith 2017). Although economic interests are thus prominent in the
decision-making process of aid allocation, China’s distribution of develop-
ment assistance ultimately must adhere to its foreign policy goals as the
‘MFA has “veto power” over whether aid serves China’s foreign policy
interests’ (Zhang and Smith 2017, 2335). Hence, in line with the findings
of Dreher et al. (2018), it is expected that:
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Hypothesis 1: China’s official financing to the Pacific Island Countries is
driven by foreign policy interests, with ODA being more affected by foreign
policy interests than OOF.
Economic Interests
As it is hypothesised that foreign policy interests play a prominent role in
directing ODA flows, it follows that, conversely, commercial-oriented flows
are guided to a greater extent by commercial incentives. In comparison to
ODA, OOF are less concessional forms of state financing and their allocation
should, in theory, be more market-based and thus aligned closely with
Beijing’s economic interests (Dreher et al. 2018, 184). This is, first of all,
demonstrated by the main agencies involved in allocation decisions of OOF.
Whereas the aforementioned line ministries of MOFCOM and MFA are the
key decision makers in the allocation of ODA flows, China’s policy banks –
e.g. China Exim Bank and China Development Bank – play a central role in
the allocation of OOF, and are primarily guided by generating favourable
financial returns on issued loans (Dornan and Brant 2014, 351; Varrall 2016,
33–34).
The allocation of OOF in the Pacific region is also likely to be guided by
China’s interest of gaining access to natural resources, including fisheries,
minerals, gold, copper, lumber, timber, and hydrocarbons. Although it would
be mistaken to assume that securing access to natural resources is the over-
riding focus of China’s OOF allocation, recent research nevertheless suggests
that China’s distribution of official financing is at least to some extent driven
by China’s resource needs (Varrall 2016, 34; Zhang and Smith 2017, 2334).7
Beijing’s trade and investment activities in the region also converge on those
PICs – Papua New Guinea in particular – that are rich in raw materials and
natural resources (Meick, Ker, and Chan 2018, 7).
Finally, China’s official financing is also expected to be driven by the
economic interest of enhancing the business performances of Chinese com-
panies by securing future access to export markets (Bräutigam 2009, 2011).
This is part of China’s ‘Go Global Strategy’ in which Chinese firms are
encouraged to explore trade, future investment, and market access opportu-
nities overseas (Davies et al. 2008). Specifically, ‘the tied nature of Chinese
aid fits with its idea that aid should be “win-win”, with Chinese companies,
suppliers, and workers also benefiting from the provision of assistance’
(Dornan and Brant 2014, 352). China’s official financing is an important
element of this strategy as it helps Chinese companies to gain a foothold in
new markets, thus enabling them to enhance the exports of goods and
services as well as to secure future contracts (Zhang and Smith 2017). All
in all, these considerations imply that the distribution of less concessional
financing should be based on China’s economic interests.
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Hypothesis 2: China’s official financing to the Pacific Island Countries is
guided by economic interests, with OOF being influenced by economic
interests to a larger extent than ODA.
Institutional Quality
China’s principle of non-interference into countries’ internal affairs implies
that Beijing’s provision of financial assistance is unhampered by the recipi-
ents’ regime type and institutional quality (Dreher and Fuchs 2015, 994).
Critics, however, argue that China’s financial assistance – with ‘no strings
attached’ – allows it to engage with countries with bad governance
(Kurlantzick 2006). More explicitly, it is believed that ‘Chinese aid will
weaken democracy, governance and human rights, fail to promote develop-
ment, weaken social and environmental standards and increase corruption’
(Dreher and Fuchs 2015, 995).8 The literature on China’s official financing
has, however, indicated that there is mixed support for the hypothesis that
Beijing allocates projects to countries with low levels of institutional quality –
i.e. undemocratic, politically unstable, and corrupt countries (see, for
instance, Bräutigam 2011; Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Isaksson and Kotsadam
2018; Tull 2006).
Similar to China’s foreign policy interests and economic interests, it is
anticipated that the institutional quality of potential recipient countries has
distinctive effects on the type of financing provided, i.e. ODA versus OOF.
Regarding China’s financial flows of a less concessional nature, it is assumed
that they are motivated by economic considerations. For China’s OOF it is
thus expected that the institutional quality of recipient PICs plays an impor-
tant role as it impacts both loan repayment capacity and loan profitability,
which pertain to the guiding principle of generating strong financial returns
on loans issued by China’s policy banks. Or, as emphasised by the China
Exim Bank (2011), ‘the borrowing country shall have sound diplomatic
relations with the Chinese Government, and shall be politically stable and
economically sound, with debt servicing capacity and reliable contract per-
formance record’ (as quoted in Dornan and Brant 2014, 351–352). On the
other hand, if China would adhere to the principle of non-interference, there
should not be any relation between the institutional quality variables and the
allocation of the distinct flows of official financing. The hypothesis below
corresponds with the ‘rogue donor’ narrative.
Hypothesis 3: China’s official financing to the Pacific Island Countries is
directed by the institutional quality of potential recipient states, with ODA
converging on Pacific Island Countries with lower levels of institutional
quality and OOF concentrating on those with higher.
GEOPOLITICS 7
Data
China’s Official Financing to the Pacific
Although China’s development efforts have a traditional aid component that
adheres to the criteria stipulated by the OECD-DAC, China’s development
financing extends well beyond its official aid programme (Xu and Carey
2014). In fact, the lion’s share of Beijing’s official financing is not actually
ODA, but instead export credits, non-concessional loans, or financing used
to foster Chinese investment (Bräutigam 2011). As such, in line with
AidData’s methodology Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF),
China’s official or development financing is defined here as any type of
state financing – ODA or OOF – from the donor (or lender) country,
China, to a recipient (or borrower), PIC. The term ODA will be used in
case a reference is made to the narrower DAC definition of development
finance, in which aid flows must have a development intent and a minimum
level of concessionality (set at a 25 per cent or higher grant element). If
reference is made to finance flows which are lacking development intent or
are characterised by higher interest rates and lower grant elements – hence
lacking the minimum level of concessionality that is necessary to be classified
as ODA – the term OOF is used (Dreher et al. 2017, 2–4).
Given that China neither reports systematic project-level data nor releases
official figures on its annual bilateral official financing flows abroad (includ-
ing the Pacific Islands region), quantitative data on China’s official financing
flows is scarce and generally unreliable. It should thus be treated with caution
(Swedlund 2017, 397). To measure China’s state financing to the PICs, this
paper relies on AidData’s Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset (version
1.0), which covers 328 country-specific ODA and OOF projects to recipient
PICs over the 2000–2014 time period – accounting for a total amount of
development financing approximating US$2.9 billion (Dreher et al. 2017).9
AidData’s figures on Chinese ODA and OOF are based on the TUFF
methodology, which draws from open-source, project-specific information
produced by various (non-)governmental organisations, including media
outlets (Dreher et al. 2017, 7). Of course, collecting data through media
reports is not without its problems, as such reports may be biased or
incomplete. In addition, the use of crowdsourcing techniques to gather
data is likely to lead to overestimations of China’s financing flows.
Nonetheless, AidData’s method of triangulating open-source information is
deemed rigorous enough to draw reliable conclusions (see Strange et al.
2017). At present, the database provides the most complete comparative
data on China’s financing flows.
From AidData’s database, this paper has selected all of China’s bilateral
ODA and OOF projects allocated to the PICs of Timor-Leste, Papua New
Guinea, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji, Tonga, Nauru,
8 B. J. VAN GRIEKEN AND J. KANTOROWICZ
the Marshall Islands, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Samoa,
between the years of 2000 and 2014.10 For the purposes of this research, the
PICs Niue and the Cook Islands are excluded from analysis, as these island
states are not formal members of the United Nations and thus not eligible to
vote in the UNGA. In effect, the first hypothesis cannot be tested for either of
these island countries.
Only projects that are coded as ‘recommended for research’ are included
in the analysis, which implies the exclusion of umbrella projects, pledges, and
cancelled or suspended projects. This approach ensures that double counting
is avoided, as well as mitigates overestimations of the allocation of Chinese
state financing to the region by ruling out projects that have never been fully
committed or implemented. Projects allocated by Beijing to the broader
Pacific Islands region, instead of bilaterally, are not included in this research’s
dataset because they would not directly measure the country-specific deter-
minants of the distribution of Chinese official financing in which this study is
interested.11
The baseline regressions only deal with those finance flows that are quantified
in monetary terms. Thus, projects which are not expressed in monetary terms
are given the value of 0. However, given that around 38% of the projects lack
information about their respective financial value, examining only those projects
with financial value would provide an incomplete picture of China’s allocation of
development financing. As such, the analysis is expanded to include the total
number of projects allocated to a specific PIC.
The dependent variable is the (logged) aggregated sum of (deflated) ODA
and OOF received by a recipient PIC in any given year, which represents the
total amount of bilateral state financing per year allocated by Beijing to each
respective PIC. In order to adequately test whether China’s official financing
flows are guided by its foreign policy interests, economic interests, or the
institutional quality of potential recipients (Hypotheses 1–3), the determi-
nants of China’s allocation of ODA and OOF are compared, as well as the
flow types of grants and loans. Like the primary outcome variable, the values
of ODA, OOF, grants, and loans are deflated and logarithmatised. Overall, if
only the financial flows that are recommended for research are considered,
ODA was recorded for 32% of the country-years under investigation,
whereas OOF only accounts for 5%. Since this may have some implications
on how reliable the estimations are for OOF (see further discussion in the
results section), additional regressions are performed that employ different
categorisations of the dependent variable, i.e. grants and loans. In this case,
grants account for 31% of the country-years whereas loans are recorded for
12% of the country-years.
Figure 1 reveals two noteworthy patterns regarding the development of
Chinese official financing to the Pacific Islands region. On the one hand,
although there are some dips likely because of the economic recessions,
GEOPOLITICS 9
Fi
gu
re
1.
Ag
gr
eg
at
io
n
of
Ch
in
a’
s
of
fic
ia
lf
in
an
ci
ng
to
th
e
Pa
ci
fic
Is
la
nd
co
un
tr
ie
s,
20
00
–2
01
4.
10 B. J. VAN GRIEKEN AND J. KANTOROWICZ
from 2006 onwards there has been generally a stable trend in the
distribution of development financing to the PICs. The data reveals
that in 2006 there was a sharp increase in state financing to the region.
This can be explained by China organising the 1st China-Pacific Island
Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in 2006,
announcing US$492 million in concessional loans to the island states
(Dornan and Brant 2014, 349). In the following years, Chinese financing
flows to the PICs has remained relatively stable. The figure shows
a downwards trend in development financing to the Pacific from 2013
onwards. However, it is important to mention that China announced
a new assistance package to the region in 2013 at the 2nd China-Pacific
Islands Countries Forum, pledging US$2 billion in concessional loans
and support for infrastructure development in the Pacific (Zhang and
Lawson 2017, 199).
Explanatory Variables
To assess whether Beijing utilises development finance to pursue its foreign
policy objectives (Hypothesis 1), the next step of this analysis examines the
voting behaviour of recipient PICs in the UNGA. The literature on aid allocation
has mainly resorted to indicators of UNGA voting coincidence to gauge the
political alignment between states (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Carter and Stone
2015; Dreher et al. 2018; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Hosli et al.
2010; Strüver 2016). UNGA votes are, however, often criticised for their mere
symbolic relevance, given that they are not legally binding and thus arguably
insufficient for deducting meaningful conclusions as to the degree of states’
convergence in foreign policies. Furthermore, given that UNGA resolutions
often relate to matters of international security and human rights instead of
economic development, the UNGA does not necessarily reflect the full range of
foreign policy concerns and the overall balance of foreign policy goals of those
countries participating in the UNGA (Ferdinand 2014).
Nonetheless, it is exactly their symbolic nature that make UNGA votes
a true expression of a state’s normative preferences (Hosli et al. 2010; Voeten
2000). The nonbinding nature of such votes makes strategic voting a less
prevalent feature in the UNGA than, for instance, the UNSC (Bailey,
Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017, 436–437). Assessing the voting behaviour of
the PICs in the UNGA over an extended period of time and across a wide
range of issues should thus demonstrate fluctuations in both voting patterns
and, by extension, the degree of convergence between states’ foreign policies
(Voeten 2000, 185–186). Hence, UNGA voting patterns can be used to
determine whether China uses its official financing to pursue its foreign
policy objectives, with those countries voting along with China in the
UNGA being rewarded with increased flows of Chinese state financing.
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This study draws on UNGA voting records, which have been documented
by Erik Voeten (2013), to assess the PICs’ voting patterns in the UNGA.
Specifically, Lijphart’s Index of Agreement, also referred to as the Index of
Voting Cohesion (IVC), is used to capture a voting similarity score that
ranges between 0 and 1 (Lijphart 1963). The IVC considers three different
voting alternatives: (1) state A and state B are in full agreement, either by
both voting yes, both voting no, or both abstaining; (2) both countries are in
complete disagreement, i.e. state A votes yes and state B votes no, or vice
versa; (3) both nations are in partial agreement if either state A or state
B votes yes or no, and the other abstains. Votes in agreement with the state of
interest are coded as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions as 0.5.
The resulting numbers are then divided by the overall number of votes cast
each year (Lijphart 1963).
To check the robustness of the IVC, Gartzke’s (2006) UNGA Affinity of
Nations S-score (‘s2un’) and the ideal point distance measurement developed
by Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017) are employed. Gartzke’s (2006) s2un
index assesses the voting similarity of a dyad of countries based on votes in
agreement and votes in disagreement. The ideal point distance measurement
assesses state preferences by calculating the ideal point distance of a dyad, or
the extent to which a country’s ideal point in UNGA resolutions differs from
the ideal point of the country of interest (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017).
Another point of contention lies in which votes should be analysed. Based
on previous research indicating that states may only be interested in buying
votes which they consider salient, the preferred approach may be focusing on
a sub-set of important resolutions (Carter and Stone 2015; Wang 1999).
However, the drawback of this approach is that, unlike U.S. designated
important votes, there is no publicly available data concerning which resolu-
tions Beijing might consider vital to its national interests. Several studies on
China have concentrated on resolutions that concern norms presumed to be
important to Beijing, such as human rights, sovereignty, international order,
non-interference, and democracy (Brazys and Dukalskis 2017; Flores-Macías
and Kreps 2013). Yet labelling votes as being relevant to China is highly
subjective (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Dreher and Sturm 2012).
Thus, fixating only on sub-sets of votes is likely to provide an incomplete
picture of the degree of political alignment between the PICs and Beijing.
Therefore, this paper will not limit its focus to such a sub-set, but will rather
examine all UNGA resolutions between the years of 2000 and 2014.
To test the role of a state’s stance on the One-China policy, this research
employs a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a PIC main-
tains formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and zero if a PIC recognises
China.12 The data on Taiwan recognition is drawn from Rich (2009) and has
been updated for the period 2010 to 2014.13 Based on the coding of the
Taiwan variable, only two observations – Nauru and Kiribati – shifted
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recognition from Taiwan to China between, or vice versa, between 2000 and
2014. As such, whether or not shifts in recognition lead to a bump in
financing cannot be reliably estimated, although the anecdotal evidence
suggests that changing diplomatic recognition coincides with increased
flows from either Taiwan or China.14
Regarding Hypothesis 2, this paper includes two distinct indicators to
ascertain whether China’s economic interests influence the allocation of its
finance flows to the Pacific, with a focus on Chinese OOF. As a proxy for
China’s potential interest of securing access to raw materials and natural
resources, this paper includes a composite indicator variable that accounts
for whether or not the PICs produced natural resources in any given year
(British Geological Survey 2019).15
In addition, the debt-to-GDP ratio is included as it accounts for a state’s
creditworthiness. More explicitly, if the likelihood of repayment is an ele-
ment factored into Beijing’s provision of state financing, then one would
expect to find a negative correlation between the ratio of debt-to-GDP and
the receipt of Chinese OOF (Dreher et al. 2018, 187). The data on the PICs’
indebtedness is taken from the International Monetary Fund’s Historical
Public Debt Database (Abbas et al. 2010).
This paper employs two variables to measure the potential effects of
recipient institutional quality on the development finance allocation deci-
sions made by China. First, the Freedom House’s Political Rights (FHPR)
index is employed, ranging from 1 (high level of political rights) to 7
(political rights absent or virtually non-existent) (Freedom House 2018).
The level of a state’s institutional quality is often captured by using the
Polity scores in the Polity IV dataset (see, among others, Dreher et al.
2018; Rich 2009). However, Polity does not include any nation with
a population of less than five hundred thousand, which affects the majority
of this research’s units of analysis (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017).
Therefore, this paper relies on the FHPR index. If Beijing would indeed
maintain strict adherence to the principle of non-interference, one would
expect to observe allocation of ODA and OOF irrespective of the recipient’s
institutional quality. If, however, the ‘rogue donor’ argument holds true, then
ODA flows should target PICs with lower levels of institutional quality. In
addition, OOF, considered to be guided by loan profitability and countries’
loan repayment capacity, should be designated to PICs with higher levels of
institutional quality. This is related to the fact that high institutional quality,
in terms of political stability and rule-based governance, is a direct contri-
butor to the profitability of OOF. The second variable which this analysis
employs is the Control of Corruption Index – which ranges from −2.5 to 2.5,
with lower values representing more corruption – as it is an often-used
indicator for institutional quality (Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Dreher et al.
2018; World Bank 2018a).
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Finally, this research controls for potentially influential alternative expla-
nations. To control for recipient need, logged population size is used (taken
from World Bank 2018b). Arguably, larger countries need more resources to
develop, thus one would anticipate a strong positive correlation between
population size and distributed development flows (Dreher and Fuchs
2015; Dreher et al. 2018; Thorvaldsdottir 2015). More specifically, it is
expected that population size not only influences the allocation of ODA,
but also of OOF, as larger countries have larger markets and thus draw in
more commercial flows.
As an additional proxy for recipient need, per capita income is included
(taken from World Bank 2018c). Empirical studies have repeatedly indicated
that per capita income shapes the distribution of development finance
(Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Dreher et al. 2018; Thorvaldsdottir 2015).
Therefore, one would expect there to be a strong, negative association
between Chinese ODA flows and the per capita income of recipient states.
For an overview of the variables and their respective sources, see Table S1 via
Supplementary Materials16.
Statistical Analysis
Econometric Analysis
To test the hypotheses put forth in Section 2, the following regression model
is estimated:
ofit ¼ β0 þ β1politicalit1 þ β2economicit1 þ β3institutionalit1
þ β4controlit1 þ at þ εit
where ofit represents the dependent variable: China’s official financing to
a recipient country i in year t. The dependent variable is log-transformed;
a standard procedure in situations where the outcome variable is positively
skewed and contains a substantial portion of zeros.17 The other explanatory
variables consist of four vectors that have been outlined above. More expli-
citly, politicalit1 captures the political variables of UNGA voting coincidence
and recognition of Taiwan; economicit1 comprises the economic variables,
consisting of a country’s natural resources index and its debt-to-GDP ratio;
and institutionalit1 covers the institutional quality variables, including the
FHPR index score and the Control of Corruption score. Lastly, controlit1
stands for the two control variables, i.e. a country’s population size and per
capita income.
All variables are measured with a temporal lag of one year because it is
assumed that the interstate political and economic linkages, as well as the
institutional quality characteristics, have to precede the outcome of interest.
Subscript at stands for year-fixed effects, and εit represents a stochastic error
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term. The main regression that is used to test the hypotheses is pooled OLS,
to primarily account for cross-country variation. In the actual regressions,
this equation will be expanded by separately examining the effects of the
explanatory variables on the logarithmatised outcome variables odait, oofit,
grantsit, and loansit. Summary statistics can be found in Table 1.
Results
Table 2 shows the results when using the logged transformation of both the
amount and number of China’s financing flows to the Pacific Islands region
as the paper’s dependent variables. The models illustrate that, contrary to the
expectation set out in Hypothesis 1, Beijing does not use state financing as
a reward by providing more official financing to PICs that vote with China in
the UNGA. This finding remains constant even if the number of Chinese
projects is used as the dependent variable instead of the amount of China’s
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variables
OF (log) 5.326 7.586 0 19.551 192
OF Number (log) 0.561 0.739 0 2.485 192
OF/Vague (log) 5.464 7.694 0 19.551 192
OF/Vague Num. (log) 0.575 0.749 0 2.565 192
OF/All (log) 6.177 7.934 0 19.576 192
OF/All Num. (log) 0.635 0.795 0 2.773 192
ODA (log) 5.108 7.521 0 19.551 192
ODA Number (log) 0.541 0.726 0 2.485 192
ODA/All (log) 5.868 7.869 0 19.576 192
ODA/All Num. (log) 0.613 0.782 0 2.773 192
Grants (log) 4.598 6.999 0 18.725 192
Grants Number (log) 0.439 0.629 0 2.197 192
OOF (log) 0.571 2.823 0 18.541 192
OOF Number (log) 0.045 0.179 0 1.099 192
OOF/Vague (log) 0.953 3.802 0 19.313 192
OOF/Vague Num. (log) 0.076 0.239 0 1.386 192
OOF/All (log) 0.724 3.170 0 18.541 192
OOF/All Num. (log) 0.053 0.190 0 1.099 192
Loans (log) 2.136 5.816 0 19.366 192
Loans Number (log) 0.110 0.294 0 1.792 192
Explanatory variables
IVC China 0.568 0.247 0 1 192
s2un 0.481 0.610 −1 1 192
Ideal-points distance 1.265 0.851 0.069 3.615 192
Taiwan recognition 0.432 0.497 0 1 192
Debt 35.823 16.979 7.523 86.986 130
Resources index 0.087 0.158 0 0.8 192
FHPR 2.229 1.497 1 6 192
Corruption −0.275 0.404 −1.340 0.768 177
Population (log) 4.998 1.787 2.353 8.956 192
Per capita income 3024.076 2423.518 419.622 11682.770 185
English 0.0678 0.252 0 1 192
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official financing. Even though the IVC measurement is deemed to be more
robust as it includes partial convergence as a voting alternative, whilst
simultaneously excluding absences that may lead to overestimated levels of
voting similarity, the robustness of the results is further tested by employing
alternative voting indices. Yet, the results do not show significantly different
results from those employing the IVC measurement (see Tables S2-S7 in
Supplementary Materials). Although the models employing Gartzke’s S-score
(Tables S2-S4) occasionally yield statistically significant results, in particular
concerning the correlation between s2un and China’s official financing, the
overall inconsistency of these findings strengthens the conclusion that there
is no relationship between voting at the UNGA and China’s financial flows.
Tables S5-S7 replace the UNGA voting alignment indicators with the ideal
point estimates. Besides one regression, however, this variable does not reach
conventional levels of statistical significance.
The main regression models in Table 2 substantiate the expectation that
China punishes those that recognise Taiwan in terms of the likelihood and
extent to which official financing is received from Beijing, a finding that is
significant across all four models at the .001 level of significance. Moreover,
the distribution of official financing seems to be guided by China’s resource
needs, as Models 1 and 3 indicate that those PICs that produce more natural
resources receive more financing. Furthermore, an increase in the Control of
Corruption index (ranging from −2.5 to 2.5) is associated with receiving
fewer projects from China, meaning that less corrupt PICs receive less official
financing from China. However, this finding is limited to Model 3 because
the other three corruption estimates employed in the different models fail to
reach statistical significance.
Whilst these findings apply only to the aggregated value and number of
China’s financing activities in the Pacific, it is important to turn to the
hypotheses in order to test if these aggregate results are directed by either
Table 2. Pooled OLS regression models of China’s official financing determinants.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OF (log) OF (log) OF Number (log) OF Number (log)
IVC China t – 1 0.588 (2.461) 3.336 (2.729) −0.000806 (0.216) −0.0302 (0.266)
Taiwan recognition t – 1 −8.800 (1.206)*** −6.912 (1.804)*** −0.991 (0.106)*** −0.815 (0.176)***
Resources index t – 1 9.462 (5.311)* −2.982 (8.296) 0.828 (0.466)+ 0.614 (0.810)
FHPR t – 1 0.585 (0.411) −0.603 (0.666) 0.0245 (0.036) −0.0291 (0.065)
Corruption t – 1 0.525 (1.346) −1.288 (2.275) −0.293 (0.118)* −0.233 (0.222)
Population (log) t – 1 −0.00681 (0.633) 2.292 (1.102)* −0.00729 (0.055) 0.102 (0.108)
Per capita income t – 1 0.453 (0.327) 1.901 (1.068)+ −0.0185 (0.029) 0.0634 (0.104)
Debt t – 1 0.0181 (0.041) 0.00104 (0.004)
Constant 4.740 (4.025) −10.59 (6.769) 0.479 (0.353) −0.170 (0.661)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 164 121 164 121
R2 0.538 0.634 0.634 0.630
(Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. +p< 0.1, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.)
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China’s concessional finance flows (ODA) or by less concessional state
financing (OOF). In Models 1–4 of Table 3, China’s official financing is
disaggregated in the amount of ODA flows and the number of ODA projects.
The findings largely overlap with Table 2. The PICs’ voting behaviour in the
UNGA does not seem to influence China’s ODA distribution, whereas the
importance of recognition of Taiwan is reiterated in the aid allocation
decisions of China (Bräutigam 2009; Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Dreher et al.
2018; Rich 2009). The coefficient on the binary Taiwan recognition variable
is negative and statistically significant at the .001 level for the measurement
of China’s ODA flows and grants. In addition, the models demonstrate that
the production of natural resources is positively related with ODA and grant
allocation decisions, albeit at various significance levels and only if the PICs’
level of indebtedness is excluded from the regression analysis. Similarly, the
Control of Corruption variable is only statistically significant in those models
that include the number of ODA projects or grants and exclude the debt-to-
GDP ratio variable. Finally, the coefficients of the explanatory variables do
not show any noteworthy difference in the models that employ either ODA
or grants as the main dependent variable.
Regarding the determinants of China’s OOF distribution, Table 4 indicates
that most explanatory variables are not correlated with the outcome vari-
ables. This is especially surprising in relation to the economic variables – i.e.
the resources index variable and the debt-to-GDP ratio variable. Somewhat
unexpected is the role of Taiwan recognition, which seems to not only
influence the designation of ODA flows, but also the allocation of OOF.
Although the relation is only significant in Model 3, in the other OOF
models the coefficients nevertheless move in a negative direction.
Additionally, in line with the findings of Dreher et al. (2018), the voting
behaviour of the PICs does not appear to influence China’s decision-making
as to the distribution of OOF. Finally, the FHPR index shows some correla-
tion, albeit merely in relation to Model 3 and at the .1 significance level.
More interesting is the FHPR’s impact on the issuing of loans (Models 5
and 7), as the coefficients highlight that loans are primarily issued to PICs
with lower levels of institutional quality, a finding that is significant at the .01
threshold. This finding seems to run counter to the presumption that OOF
flows are guided by the principle of generating strong financial returns on
issued loans.
If additional robustness checks are run by treating ‘vague’ flows as OOF
projects, following the practice of Dreher et al. (2018), the relationship
between the FHPR index and OOF becomes somewhat less ambiguous. As
seen in Table S9 in Supplementary Materials, the FHPR index is strongly
correlated with OOF/Vague flows, at the .01 level across all four models,
which implies that PICs with lower levels of institutional quality receive more
and larger amounts of OOF/Vague projects. Although this seems
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counterintuitive, Model 1 indicates that OOF/Vague flows are nonetheless
directed towards less corrupt PICs, which suggests that the institutional
quality of recipient does play a role in the distribution of less-concessional
finance.
Two additional robustness checks are carried out as can be seen in Tables
S10-S13 in Supplementary Materials. The models indicate that if all financial
flows to the PICs are included, thus not conditioning only on the flows that
are recommended for research, the results stay largely the same. Secondly, by
controlling for whether English is an official language, possible underreport-
ing of financial to the PICs that do not officially use English is adjusted for.
This is, however, not a recurring issue in the Pacific sample because only one
country – Timor Leste – does not have English as an official language.
Regardless, after controlling for this the results remain the same (see Tables
S10-S11).
Taken together, these findings yield mixed support for this paper’s hypoth-
eses. Firstly, with regards to China’s foreign policy interests, the analysis
indicates that for the aid-dependent PICs, respecting the One-China policy is
more important than voting alignment for the extent and likelihood of
receiving official financing, ODA, OOF, grants, and loans. This finding is
somewhat different from the results of recent studies on the determinants of
China’s development financing, such as those of Dreher and Fuchs (2015)
and Dreher et al. (2018).
Secondly, the analysis provides limited support for the hypothesis that, as
opposed to ODA, OOF flows are influenced to a greater extent by China’s
economic interests (H2). More explicitly, the evidence suggests that, instead
of OOF, official financing flows and particularly ODA projects are driven by
China’s need to gain access to the PICs’ natural resources.
Thirdly, the regressions provide limited evidence that the distribution of
China’s ODA is contingent on the institutional quality of its potential
recipients. On the one hand, an increase in the Control of Corruption
index (ranging from −2.5 to 2.5) reduces the number of official financing
projects, which, by extension, is particularly driven by the number of ODA
projects and grants. On the other hand, the FHPR index appears to be
statistically significant in models looking at the relationship between OOF
projects and the number of loans. This latter conclusion supports, albeit to
a limited extent, the rogue donor argument.
Lastly, although the explanatory variables fail to adequately explain the
distribution of China’s OOF, the lack of correlation between the economic
variables and the different outcome variables employed across the various
models is nevertheless a valuable insight. More specifically, the regressions
demonstrate the lack of influence of the PICs’ level of indebtedness on either
the aggregate value and number of China’s development projects or its
disaggregated parts: ODA, OOF, grants, and loans. This reveals that the
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allocation of China’s OOF may not necessarily be driven by the creditworthi-
ness of recipient countries. Most importantly, in line with the findings of Fox
and Dornan (2018), the lack of a statistically significant relationship between
the types of official financing and the PICs’ debt-to-GDP ratio suggests that
China does not engage in aggressive lending to the insolvent PICs who are
unable to pay back the loans, which, in effect, leaves them vulnerable to
China’s influence. This mirrors a phenomenon known as ‘debt-trap diplo-
macy’ in which Beijing converts economic loss into geopolitical gain (Parker
and Chefitz 2018; see also Dornan and Brant 2014; Zhang 2018a, 2018b).
However, it is important to note that there were only 10 OOF-type transfers
from China to these PICs in the time period under consideration; hence, the
model may fail to estimate the precise causes of such rare events.
Conclusion
With China continuing to expand its development footprint in the Pacific,
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have increasingly abandoned
the region. Additionally, concern among traditional donors about their
waning influence over the aid-dependent PICs, alongside China’s heightened
economic engagement with the island states, has sparked a number of
vigorous debates. In spite of a burgeoning qualitative literature on the
allocation of China’s development finance to the PICs, to date there have
been few quantitative attempts to examine China’s official financing to the
Pacific Islands region. Although this is primarily the result of Beijing’s
reluctance to disclose its overseas development activities, the current litera-
ture on China’s distribution of state financing also tends to fixate on African
recipients of Chinese development projects. This study has attempted to
deepen existing research on China’s development efforts by investigating
the determinants of Beijing’s financing flows to the PICs.
Following previous work by Dreher et al. (2018), this paper differentiates
between China’s different official financing flow types: ODA versus less-
concessional forms of state financing, OOF. In line with the conclusions reached
by Dreher et al. (2018), it was hypothesised that the allocation of ODA is
primarily guided by Beijing’s foreign interests, whilst OOF is largely driven by
China’s economic interests. It was also expected that the institutional quality of
potential recipient PICs influences China’s distribution of official finance, with
the allocation of ODA being largely motivated by lower levels of institutional
quality and of OOF by higher levels. To test these hypotheses, this paper has
systemically explored the connections between Chinese state financing flows to
thirteen Pacific Island states over the 2000–2014 period and different clusters of
possible motivations behind China’s official provision of financing, including:
Beijing’s foreign policy interests, Chinese economic interests, and the institu-
tional quality of potential recipients.
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In contrast to previous studies on Western foreign aid allocation and on
China’s distribution of development finance, this paper has found no
evidence in support of the assumption that China either rewards or
punishes countries based on their voting behaviour. Rather than demon-
strate the salience of the PICs’ voting compliance in the UNGA, the results
reiterate the importance of state recognition of Taiwan. PICs with formal
ties with the Chinese mainland were thus rewarded with official financing,
in terms of likelihood and amount. To some extent, this analysis also
indicates that natural resources are considered as part of China’s develop-
ment finance allocation process, as the PICs producing natural resources
receive increased official financing, ODA in particular. On the other hand,
this analysis has provided mixed support at best for the hypothesis that
China acts as a ‘rogue donor’ by targeting PICs with lower levels of
institutional quality. There is only weak evidence supporting the claim
that the number of Chinese ODA projects and grants are concentrated on
those PICs with higher levels of corruption, which goes against China’s
principle of non-interference.
In contrast, despite determining the drivers of China’s official financing
flows and particularly Beijing’s allocation of ODA, this analysis has fallen
short in convincingly demonstrating the particular motivations behind
China’s distribution of OOF. The only somewhat consistent evidence found
was for the relationship between the quality of institutional setup and OOF,
whereby PICs with lower institutional quality attract more OOF. Importantly
however, and contrary to popular belief, China does not seem to engage in
debt-trap diplomacy through practices of aggressive lending to the PICs, as
neither the allocation of China’s aggregate of official financing nor its
disaggregated flows of ODA and OOF seem to be related to the PICs’ level
of indebtedness.
Given the scarce number of statistical studies on China’s development
efforts in the Pacific, this analysis calls attention to the need for more
quantitative research on China’s financing activities in the Pacific. Further
research into the disaggregation of China’s different types of state financing
is not only recommended, but also much needed. More academic effort is
required in tracking the provision of Chinese OOF to the PICs, especially
given China’s increasing role as a major non-traditional aid donor in the
region. Furthermore, recent attempts aimed at mapping China’s official
financing in the Pacific Islands region continue to lump together Beijing’s
ODA and OOF under the ‘aid’ label. In doing so, China’s different motiva-
tions behind the allocation of both disparate financing flows remain incor-
rectly associated with Chinese ‘aid’. The apparent lack of adequate data and
analysis on China’s disaggregated official financing in the Pacific contributes
to skewed debates on Chinese development activities in the region and
22 B. J. VAN GRIEKEN AND J. KANTOROWICZ
fosters misunderstandings of the motivations and determinants for its for-
eign aid.
Notes
1. For an extensive literature review on China’s aid distribution, see Carter (2017).
2. Referring to Chinese aid projects in the PICs, Australia’s Minister for International
Development and the Pacific, Concetta Fierravanti-Wells, stated: ‘[you have] got the
Pacific full of these useless buildings which nobody maintains, which are basically
white elephants’ (Wembridge 2018).
3. For instance, according to the International Monetary Fund, Tonga, Vanuatu, and
Samoa are at high risk of external debt distress and all have significant debt to Beijing
(International Monetary Fund 2016a, 2016b, 2017). The public debt level in Tonga is
around 43 per cent of GDP with 39 per cent being external debt. Two significant loans
from China Exim Bank (US$72.14 and US$47.71 million) account for approximately
two-thirds of Tonga’s external debt stock and around 2 per cent is owed to the Bank of
China (Dornan and Brant 2014, 353).
4. See also Smith (2018).
5. In April 2018, reports emerged that China had approached Vanuatu about the possi-
bility of establishing a Chinese military base, which was later denied by both Chinese
and Vanuatu officials (Williams 2018).
6. China has formal diplomatic relations with the Cook Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Kiribati, the
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu, on the other hand,
maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
7. For further discussion on whether or not China’s official financing to the Pacific is tied
to natural resource extraction in the Pacific, see Wesley-Smith (2013), Brant (2013) and
Zhang (2017).
8. In this respect, reference is often made to the controversial Ramu nickel and cobalt
mine located in Papua New Guinea that is financed by both the China Development
Bank and China Exim Bank (Varrall 2018).
9. Projects listed as ‘Vague Official Finance’ have not been considered given the lack of
information about the projects’ level of concessionality or intent that is necessary to
make a clear distinction between ODA and OOF.
10. The selection of the PICs is based on the categorisation of the United Nations
Department of Economic Affairs on the world’s Small Island Developing States (2018).
11. AidData’s dataset contains four regional projects allocated to the Pacific of which only
one flow is labelled as ‘recommended for research’, yet lacks any monetary value. This
data scarcity provides further justification for the exclusion of regional flows in the
analysis of China’s financing flows to the PICs.
12. To further substantiate the IVC measure of foreign policy convergence, the voting
similarity between the PICs that do and do not recognise Taiwan has been compared.
Employing the IVC measure, the PICs that recognise Taiwan have an IVC score of
48%. In contrast, those PICs that have formal diplomatic relations with China show
a substantially higher level of voting similarity, namely 63%. This difference is sig-
nificant at any conventional level.
13. To account for PICs switching diplomatic recognition between China and Taiwan
within short periods of time, only if PICs have had formal diplomatic relations with
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Taipei or Beijing for over a year, the coding of the binary variable is changed
accordingly.
14. Nauru is an illustrative case in terms of ‘chequebook diplomacy’, i.e. diplomatic
recognition in return for financial assistance. On 21 July 2002, Nauru decided to
sever its diplomatic relations with Taiwan when Beijing promised to grant the small
island state US$60 million and to relieve the country’s US$77 million debt (Tak-ho
2002). At the time, Nauru faced significant financial distress and neared bankruptcy.
When Taiwan refused Nauru President Rene Harris’ request for a fivefold increase in
Taiwan’s annual aid (to US$10 million), Harris approached China. Although Nauru
had been a long-time ally of Taiwan, the island state accepted the Chinese monetary
assistance in return for recognising Beijing. Three years later, prompted by China’s
failure to come up with the pledged millions in aid and Taiwan’s assistance in paying
off a debt of US$13.5 million, Nauru switched its loyalty back to Taipei again (Su 2005;
Van Fossen 2007).
15. The index variable is based on whether or not the PICs produced the following natural
resources: bauxite, chromium, cobalt, copper, gold, nickel, crude petroleum, natural
gas, phosphate, and silver. These commodities represent the natural resources that are
most often produced by the PICs. If a country produces all ten resources, it gets a score
of 1. If, however, it produces 5 out of 10, it gets a score of 0.5.
16. Supplementary Materials are available under the following URL: https://osf.io/mwk6a/.
17. The following transformation was performed: ln ofit þ 1ð Þ.
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